Other People's Futures

Olmert, Livni, Barak and Yishai have no objection to getting headlines now and paying for them with other people's futures.

I won’t comment extensively now about prisoner exchanges in general and the particular exchanges being negotiated with Hizbullah and Hamas. Six months ago I expressed my opinion here and I haven’t changed my mind.

I will only add that Israeli politicians’ stewardship of their country’s security is epitomized by the prisoner exchanges now being negotiated, in which Israel has given up the maximum in return for the minimum. The greatest incentive possible is being given to further terrorism.

All the experts warn that the deals further portray Israel as a hapless victim to be brutalized. For the politicians, the only thing that matters is the temporary orgy of emotionalism that will fleetingly sweep the popular press, in which they will play a part and have their pictures taken. They will have brought the boys—in some cases, their remains—home. Olmert, Barak and Yishai need an achievement, after their fatuous political performances last week, as something that can be spun as an achievement whether it is one or not. It does not matter how bitterly other families and other political leaders will have cause to rue it in the future. That, after all, will happen to other people and at other times.

This attitude is the exact opposite of stewardship: The use of public interests and resources for private advantage, with disregard for the consequences because they will likely be borne by other people.

Knesset Kremlinology

I don’t like to engage in straight political commentary, but sometimes something needs pointing out. Originally I was trained as a Sovietologist. I learned the arcane art of analyzing official statements in Pravda to discern when policy was being changed, and who in the Kremlin was doublecrossing whom. While I don’t consider myself an expert in the field of modern “media,” a lot of my old skills come in useful when applied to the Israeli press—especially Ha’aretz.

Ha’aretz is a lot like Pravda. All its writers are ideologically committed to Peace Messianism, with a few token exceptions like Nadav Shragai and Yisrael Harel. Many of them are connected to various portions of the left-wing establishment, and reflect the interests, passions and aversions of their chosen factions. As in the former Soviet press, why a news item appears and how it is presented often matters more than the facts it contains.

Thus on Friday a report appeared under the byline of Haaretz’ political reporter, Yossi Verter, telling us that “people close to Olmert” were referring to Ehud Barak as a “whipped cur,” a coward who again made a threat and backed off when challenged by Olmert. The whole tone of the “news item” smells like Verter got it ready written from one of Olmert’s spin doctors. The news, supposedly, is that this is Olmert’s opinion of Barak. The point however is not to impart information but to influence attitudes.

Barak’s conduct last week does not justify such crowing. Barak achieved what he set out to do—he got Kadima to agree to hold primaries, and he did it without Labor having to leave its cushy ministerial chairs. He’s won on points. But he made one serious mistake: He gave Olmert a breathing space of three months.

The Verter article in Haaretz is meant to start destroying Barak’s reputation among the members of Israel’s leftist elite who get their opinions from Haaretz. Olmert notes that most of Labor’s MKs and ministers really, really don’t want to go to elections. Only the necessity of not creating a public breach with Barak made them go along with his threat to leave Olmert’s government. Olmert is gambling that in three months, when he runs in Kadima’s primaries and wins, or better yet welches on his promise to Barak and cancels primaries altogether, he will have so weakened Barak’s image that his Labor colleagues will no longer follow his lead.

It is equally significant that Barak has sustained two more attacks since the weekend. His former campaign manager, who worked for Tal Silberstein, once Barak’s adviser, now Olmert’s, has threatened to go to the police with evidence that Barak, too, takes cash-filled envelopes. And Amir Peretz, whom Barak replace as head of Labor, has announced he will challenge Barak for the leadership position again before the next elections—which could be quite soon. Peretz may have made his announcement independently of Olmert, but it is also quite possible that Olmert told Peretz that the Prime Minister’s spin doctors would be gunning for Barak and that now would be a good time for Peretz to make his challenge public.

To me this all feels just like the time when I perused Pravda to follow up on Suslov versus Brezhnev, Andropov versus Chernenko, and Gorbachev versus the rest. I used to thank heaven that I lived in a country which wasn’t run by hints and innuendo in Pravda. Little did I suspect then what the future would hold . . .

Human Sacrifice

Poor Shaul Mofaz. All he did was shoot his mouth off about attacking Iran for the sake of his political campaign. He didn’t actually launch F-15s or risk the life of one Israeli soldier (as transportation minister, he’s not in a position to give military orders). And everybody lands on him for talking too much and sacrificing Israel’s interests to his own personal political ambitions.

Now compare Mofaz to Barak, Livni and Olmert. The latter three (like Mofaz) are in campaign mode now. All share a common problem: They have to solve the security problem around Gaza, which now directly threatens a couple hundred thousand Israelis and is sure to get worse. At the same time, the one thing they cannot do is solve the problem. Solving it means, at a minimum, permanently taking over about 60% of Gaza, including all the territory of Gush Katif, and placing the rest of Hamastan under close blockade. They cannot do this because it means kissing goodbye to the supposed justifications for disengagement: returning Israel to “the quicksand of Gaza” and taking responsibility for the fate of the Arabs there.

Perhaps the main reason they cannot solve the Gaza problem is because they face an election. One would think that a patriotic war is good for somebody running for office. But in this case it’s just the opposite. Netanyahu’s speech will be short and to the point (I ain’t seen it, I’m just guessing): “The Likud applauds the Government of Israel’s operation to restore security to Israel’s citizens in the south. We’re behind the government all the way. We just don’t understand what took them so long. We knew they would have to do this—we told ‘em so, and they now have no choice but to implement the Likud’s policy. The only thing we’re worried about is whether the government will retreat ignominiously with its tail between its legs when the fighting is over. If Israel doesn’t want to have to do all this over yet a third time, the electorate had better vote Likud on November 11.” And that’s what the electorate will do.

So what are Livni, Olmert and Mofaz going to do? They’re going to put on a show. They will do more of the same. They will deploy twice as many or four times as many soldiers in Gaza as today and have two to four times as many fire fights with the Hamas, leading to two to four times as many casualties. They will blow up a few middle-ranking Hamas leaders. They will call it a big operation to “cut the Hamas down to size” or some such foolishness (the object should be not to cut Hamas down to size but to physically eliminate it). Of the three, only Barak still retains enough honesty to say that he wants a “middle-scale” operation. But all three of them simply want to create the impression of doing something. And while the soldiers are fighting and dying, G-d forbid, they will fill the airwaves about the need for “restraint” and for “leaving an opening for a political resolution” (this is with the Hamas, mind you). Because the one thing they cannot do is solve the problem.

Actually, if they do fight, they will have an object in mind. They’ll want to hurt the Hamas—not defeat it, but hurt it. They want to soften Hamas’ terms for a long-term cease fire. And if they accomplish that objective, they will give their blessing to Abu Mazen’s new negotiations with Hamas, and try to conclude that one big, comprehensive peace agreement with a government representing—once again—the Arabs of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza, incidentally leading to the expulsion of 100,000 Israelis from their homes. I don’t think they will achieve this objective—Hamas is fifty times tougher than they—but that will be the general idea.

Who’s going to be doing this? Not Olmert’s sons. They’re in the States, happily and peacefully bringing up their kids (while neglecting to invite Morris Talansky to their bar-mitzvas—one would think that he of all people had earned an invitation). No, they’re going to send my sons, one a reservist in the artillery, another a reservist in the armored corps.

So really, Mofaz has nothing to reproach himself for. He’s nothing but talk. The trio who are so down on him for opening his mouth, Livni, Olmert and Barak, are contemplating engaging in real, live human sacrifice for the sake of their political ambitions—sacrifices that will achieve nothing in terms of Israel’s long-term security.

The grim fact is that this leadership and its policies inspire no confidence in ordinary Israelis. Nobody feels confident that when Barak or Olmert goes to war they have the best interests of the country at heart, or even know how to achieve it. And an army that feels that way will not fight and cannot win. In fact, an army that feels that way may not even show up for the war.

I have informed my sons that if for some reason they wind up spending the impending Gaza offensive in Military Prison 6, they won’t lack for brownies and chiffon cake. One comes back alive from prison.

The Untouchables

In testimony yesterday before a special Knesset committee, established to investigate the conduct of the law enforcement establishment in prosecuting former Justice Minister Haim Ramon, the current minister, Daniel Friedmann, complained that the police and the Attorney General were doing everything in their power to protect police officials and prosecutors who violated Ramon’s due-process rights. Freidmann called for the establishment of an official Commission of Inquiry. Unlike a Knesset committee, an official Commission of Inquiry can issue subpoenas, force civil servants to testify, and prescribe sanctions for offenders. As things stand now, the people who violated Ramon’s rights are untouchable.

When Kadima came to power in 2006, Olmert made Haim Ramon Justice Minister. Ramon had a brief to reform the ministry, which means especially its most powerful bureaucracy, the State Prosecution. On the eve of the Second Lebanon War Ramon kissed a woman officer stationed in the Prime Minister’s office. He says she led him on; she charged him with sexual harassment. Ramon was convicted—but not of felonious conduct. He’s now a minister again.

The really curious part had to do with the way police, prosecutors and judges handled the Ramon case. A senior police officer with a checkered history, Miri Golan, apparently pressured the young woman into filing charges. Police obtained a warrant to tap Ramon’s cellphone, apparently on false pretexts. A judge issued the warrant without asking the most basic questions as to why the warrant was needed or justified. Then, the prosecution failed to reveal the content of the wiretaps or even the fact of their existence to Ramon’s lawyers, as required by law; doing so would have revealed that the state went fishing for additional incriminating evidence and found none. All these facts were confirmed by an independent inquiry performed by retired judge Vardimon Zeiler. Nothing has been done to those responsible for deliberately or carelessly violating Ramon’s rights.

There is nothing new with Israel’s law enforcement authorities bending the law when they’re out to get a politician they don’t like. When Binyamin Netanyahu was Prime Minister, Attorney General Michael Ben-Yair, a Rabin appointee, filed trumped-up tax-evasion charges against Netanyahu’s Justice Minister, Yaakov Neeman. Later on a senior police officer, Moshe Mizrahi, obtained a warrant to wiretape conversations between Netanyahu and Avigdor Lieberman, then (and since) under investigation for corruption. On the basis of the warrant Mizrahi recorded hours and hours of purely political conversations between the two. The low-ranking police officer who spilled on Mizrahi, Stanislav Yazhemski, fled to Canada because, he said, he feared Mizrahi’s vengeance. Eventually Mizrahi was force out, a singular and exceptional development.

In the Knesset yesterday Daniel Friedmann testified in bitter tones that all his efforts to force his ministry to discipline the officials who violated due process in their haste to railroad Ramon into jail have failed. Judge Zeiler seconded Friedmann’s call for a Commission of Inquiry, saying (according to Haaretz’ Hebrew edition), “Everyone involved with [the Ramon investigation] agrees terrible things were done.”

In reaction, Haaretz reports current Chief Police Inspector David Cohen as saying, “So every time an internal investigation reaches a conclusion someone doesn’t like, we’re going to appoint a special Commission of Inquiry?” Cohen referred to the anemic “internal investigation” of the affair by the complaisant Judge Nathan Brener, appointed by Mazuz, who concluded that nothing special needed to be done to any individual.

Inspector Cohen has a point. What’s needed is not a special Commission of Inquiry. The fact is that Israel’s police and prosecutors habitually play fast and loose with the due-process and civil rights of citizens, prominent or nameless. The judges are careless in exercising their authority to oversee, and hence check, violations of citizens’ rights. The entire law enforcement establishment acts like one big happy family, claiming to act beyond reproach, in practice devoid of oversight and out of control.

Nobody in a democracy should exercise authority without oversight. What’s really needed is set up a permanent civil rights authority, independent of the police, the courts and the Justice Ministry, with the statutory right to do everything, on a permanent basis, that a one-off Commission of Inquiry can do: Hold investigations, issue subpoenas, and prescribe sanctions for judges, cops and prosecutors who go off the reservation. The appropriate place to set up such an authority is within the Office of the State Comptroller, which is already responsible for investigating the way the rest of Israel’s government is administered and is not chummy with the cops, courts and prosecutors.

Voodoo History

While researching a paper on “Jewish labor”—the movement to employ Jews in the economy of the pre-State yishuv, now proposed by some as a way to combat the Palestinian erosion of the Zionist enterprise—I read the history of the “Jewish labor” phenomenon published (in Hebrew) thirty years ago by Prof. Anita Shapira of Hebrew University This book gave me a sudden insight into the post-Zionist mind.

This blog is not really about “Jewish Labor” but it’s worth investing a minute to understand the problem, which hasn’t changed in eighty years. Back in the 1930s urban factory workers were expected to have finished eighth grade or to have a skill, and there was no problem keeping those jobs in Jewish hands. The problem arose with simple, unskilled, hard physical jobs like fruit-picking or spadework: Jews didn’t want to do them, and in any case Arabs would do them for less.

Nonetheless, for some unskilled Jewish workers in the 1920s and early 1930s, agricultural jobs—and an above-market wage for them—were very important. The interests of Jewish fruit farmers, many of whom were barely breaking even, conflicted with Jewish workers who wanted jobs in the orchards reserved for them. Sometimes the conflict wasn’t pretty: Jewish workers would drive Arabs out of the orchards. The rest of the Yishuv, led by the socialist Labor party, castigated the farmers for pursuing their private interests at the expense of Zionism. In the end the principle of Jewish labor became accepted throughout the pre-state Yishuv.

Now here is what Prof. Shapira has to say in conclusion:

"Most of the workers’ movement in the first half of the 1930s did not understand the meaning of a genuine compromise [emphasis added]. For its part, compromise had to be at least a partial victory, the result of pressure and power, and not of discussion [emphasis added]. [Futile Victory, “Conclusion,” p. 349]."

I had to read this twice before I understood it. When people have a conflict, it’s because some objective is very important to them. Even when they negotiate, they apply sanctions—“pressure and power”—to make the other side accede to their interests. The final disposition of the conflict depends on the balance of power between the two sides, and on how important to them their respective objectives were in the first place. To the degree that each side succeeds in partially realizing its objectives, it will consider that a partial victory. That was the point of the exercise all along.

But Shapira appears not to be able to accept this simple fact of life. She is distressed by the very notion of a conflict of interests turning into a conflict in fact. She is convinced there ought to be a better, nobler way. Her term for it is hidabrut, discussion. This is exactly the same term Israeli leftists use when asked for their solution to, say, the genocidal Hamas regime in Gaza. We ought to sit down and discuss things with them: “OK, you want us dead. We wouldn’t like to be dead. Can’t we come to a meeting of minds?”

The Left refuses to acknowledge the existence of a world in which fighting and killing us is a genuine, clearly articulated objective that other people think it worth sacrificing their lives to achieve. A world in which hidabrut is futile because it means asking people to give up on what they consider the most important objective in the world, the one that gives their lives meaning. A world in which it is possible that there is no compromise resolution to our conflict with theAccording to the Leftist perspective, this entire point of view is illegitimate. Force applied in the pursuit of an objective is morally wrong, no matter what the objective of the other side is. A world in which no compromise solution to our problem with the Palestinians is possible because the Palestinians really, truly don't want one. In which case our wanting one is completely beside the point. This may indeed be a tragedy, but that doesn’t make it an avoidable one

According to the Leftist perspective, this entire point of view is illegitimate. Conflicts aren’t real. They shouldn’t be expected to govern people’s behavior. Force applied in the pursuit of an objective is morally wrong, no matter what the objective of the other side is. The real way to treat any conflict is through hidabrut, a meeting of minds. People who refuse to accept this are mindless warmongers, and in the wrong by definition.

Somehow an essential aspect of human relations seems to have escaped Prof. Shapira’s notice. Her analysis of conflict is Utopian, and seems based upon willful ignorance of an essential aspect of human nature. Call it voodoo history: a happy ending will spring into being, detached from anyone’s real interests or determination to realize them. I doubt she pursues such an attitude in her daily life. Applied to international relations, this approach is crippling, deadly. Alas, it also explains a lot about Israeli foreign policy.

Looking Beyond Olmert

Behind his portly frame and seemingly unsophisticated exterior, Binyamin (Fuad) Ben-Eliezer, Minister of Infrastructure and Ehud Barak’s closest political ally, possesses one of Israel’s most cunning political minds. Fuad has been a diehard opponent of new elections: As of now, Labor looks like shedding a quarter of its seats in the Knesset, and if that happens the Labor party will hand Barak his head. Yesterday Fuad told a meeting of the Labor Party faithful, “make no mistake—we’re heading for elections.”

If even Fuad believes it’s elections, then it’s elections. Time to look beyond Olmert, beyond Kadima. I cannot do so without a strong sense of disappointment at lost opportunities. It’s not just Olmert who’s wasted two years of Israel’s time but ourselves as well, the author of this blog and all who share concern for a Jewish Israel. Israel is going to the polls, but with no real choices other than the discounted ones of yesteryear.

Something happened in the summer of 2006: The Israeli public lost its faith in the political shibboleths it has followed since Yitzhak Rabin was elected in 1992. People want peace but no longer believe in it. They oppose territorial withdrawals and think they’re bad news, with or without a piece of paper saying “treaty” on it. They have lost faith in all their public institutions: Government, politicians, courts, army, even the media, whom they despise even as they consume them compulsively. Deep beneath the surface is rising concern about the fate of the Jewish state.

The governing culture, whose various representatives are the chief candidates in the forthcoming elections, is losing its self-confidence. It is still strong, still able to defend its position, but it is in decline.

At the same time, the public declares that it feels more Jewish and more “right wing.” It is hard to determine exactly what these terms mean to those who use them. But as is often the case with social trends, the process is clearer than the particular point we have reached in it at the present or any other time.

This would be an opportune time for an alternative political leadership to present itself to the public with an alternative public agenda and, more important, an alternative cultural and ethical narrative to justify it. It’s no secret what these are:

We need to preserve the Jewish state, because it’s under mortal threat from enemies without and within.
To do that, we need first and foremost to be convinced of the justice of a Jewish state and of the policies needed to promote its welfare. That means we need to take traditional Jewish values seriously and make them the foundation of our public policy.
We need new policies in specific areas: A much more decisive foreign and military policy; large new incentives to encourage Palestinian emigration; new legal and media institutions; and a more open, competitive educational system which, without forcing anything on anyone, facilitates (=funds) access for all to the traditional Jewish values on which Israeli society must now be reconstructed.

An alternative political leadership broadcasting this message in a way accessible to the entire Israeli public would cast a giant shadow over Israeli society. It would set the agenda of this election campaign. It wouldn’t necessarily win this time, but it would set the terms of debate. And having once done so, its eventual victory, in the next elections or the ones after that, would be assured.

Unfortunately, it isn’t about to happen. We aren’t ready. We haven’t put forth the leaders and we haven’t put together the message. But we could, if we put our minds and our money to it. I think I know something of what we should be doing and, G-d willing, will write about more in the weeks ahead.

Why is Olmert different from Sharon?

It’s pretty well accepted in Israel’s political scene that Olmert is finished. By Israeli law civil servants, including elected ones, may not receive gifts. Taking bribes is a felony carrying a 7-year sentence and by past Israeli caselaw, one doesn’t need to prove that the target of bribery actually did something for his money. It’s enough to establish that the money was given and received.

The police and state prosecution have been devoting a lot of effort to Olmert’s case since November last year, when the State Comptroller, Micha Lindenstrauss, seized computer files from the Ministry of Trade, where Olmert served as minister in 2005. By law, material in the State Comptroller’s hands cannot be used as evidence in a trial, so the Comptroller returned the materials to the ministry and told the State Prosecutor, Moshe Lador, “go have a look.” Lador and the Attorney General, Menahem Mazuz authorized the police to take out a warrant for Olmert’s files from the Ministry. The rest is history.

The real question is, why is Olmert being treated differently from Ariel Sharon?

This question has aroused a lot of conspiracy theories. In Sharon’s case, the Israeli legal system simply couldn’t bring itself to stop the corrupt Messiah of disengagement. Why isn’t Olmert considered as holy? Surely there must be some deep reason why “they” want Olmert out and so have given “instructions” to topple him.

I think the conspiracy theory is subtly off the mark. A ruling elite cannot function without morale. At its height, this morale is expressed in the belief that what’s good for the elite is what’s good for society. Fifty years ago Communist parties used to believe this. Anything that increased their power was good for “the revolution,” and that justified everything.

Many years before Communism collapsed for good, doubt set in. Good Communists did not doubt the goal of Communism, but they began to doubt that the Communist Party actually served that goal. For many middle-level Communist bureaucrats (such as a young district Communist leader named Mikhail Gorbachev), it became important that the party actually act in accordance with principle, even when doing so led to the weakening of its own political position. Before long, it became evident that doing good implied the opposite of shoring up Communist rule. At that point Communist parties began to tear themselves apart, riven by conflict between those who were motivated by the good of the party and those motivated by the good of society. What took their place had nothing whatever to do with the Communism.

Something like that is starting to happen in Israel today. In Israel, the ruling ideology is not Communism but peace and post-Zionism. The elite hasn’t stopped believing in its core values, but its more sensitive members are beset by doubts. Disengagement has gone badly wrong, as its opponents predicted. The public no longer believes in peace. For that matter, it no longer believes in the elites, in Israeli political institutions, in the elite’s views of democracy and the rule of law, because the elites have betrayed those values in pursuit of the Messiah of peace. Increasingly, some members of the elite wonder if the public’s view of them isn’t justified.
The business of Olmert, Sharon and Attorney General Menahem Mazuz is a case in point. Mazuz was appointed to his job in 2004 to get Ariel Sharon off the hook. He delivered the goods, refusing to indict Sharon in two corruption cases that seemed open-and-shut (in one case, Sharon’s son was convicted and now doing time, based on evidence that should have put Sharon pere behind bars as well). In the last two years, other decisions of Mazuz—first to prepare a severe indictment against former President Katzav and then be forced to accept a plea-bargain with him, then to indict Haim Ramon, only to have a court declare there was no moral turpitude in Ramon’s kissing a young officer stationed in the Prime Minister’s office—have contributed to a precipitious decline in the legal system’s reputation. Today, Mazuz has no choice but to indict Olmert if the evidence warrants it. The entire legal system expects him to. If it fails to deliver on Olmert, it will have lost its raison d’etre in its own eyes.

Which is the point. At this point, Israel’s ruling elite can only justify its existence by harming its ideological goals and its grip on power. As the elite continues to lose self-confidence, it will increasingly lose the ability to implement its policies no matter what the cost. It is in fact on skids. Its greatest good fortune is that there is not yet any effective, incisive faith-based alternative to challenge it for control of public opinion and public policy. And that’s our fault.

A Dumb Idea

One of the striking things about Olmert’s new negotiations with Syria is that very few people are coming out and saying that the talks are a bad idea.

Ehud Barak, who probably has been kept a little bit more in the know by Olmert than most of us (and, in the last month, than Tzipi Livni) spoke about how he’s always favored negotiation. We just have to be careful about Syria and understand that nothing can be accomplished (assuming any treaty will be an accomplishment) quickly.

That seems to be the pattern. MK Michael Eitan of the Likud says on A7 today that “negotiating with Syria is like negotiating with Iran”—which one presumes means it’s a futile or dangerous idea—but says he’s in favor of negotiations. Netanyahu is in no position to say he’s against negotiations, he negotiated when he was prime minister. Various other people in different parts of the political spectrum have said similar things.

For the record (just scroll down a bit), I think the negotiations a re a dumb idea. Since it appears impossible to conclude them successfully, they tend to increase the likelihood of war. But even I haven’t said we can just decide to back out once we’ve begun, because that implies the relations between Israel and Syria are fast deteriorating toward war, and war is to be feared. Winding down these negotiations without damage will take time, patience and finesse to ensure that missiles don’t start raining down on Tel Aviv soon after they end. If they do start raining down on Tel Aviv we’ll have to go after the people firing ‘em, and that will be no fun at all.

The difference between Syria on the one hand and Hamas and the Arabs in Judaea and Samaria on the other hand is that the latter two are already doing us all the damage they can muster. No matter what we do in a military way, things won’t get substantially worse. Syria and Hizbullah could in principle do us a lot more damage than they’re doing now, and people are afraid of that.

Even politicians on the right are not saying outright that the negotiations are a mistake, though they may believe it, because you cannot tell the Israeli public that the prospect of peace with Syria is a mistake. Few people have confidence in Assad but equally few are willing to admit that a peace treaty is simply not among the options that the real world offers. That’s a regrettable weakness but politicians spend their lives accommodating their constituents’ regrettable weaknesses.

In fact, I think that both Syria and Israel were better off before the news of negotiations broke, before they were both committed to succeeding or failing at peacemaking. Not negotiating also means not forcing a confrontation once negotiations break down, as they almost inevitably will. If you can’t solve a conflict, the next best policy is benign neglect.

For Syria as well as Israel, open war would be an unmitigated disaster. They say Assad has been under enormous pressure from the Americans, because they boycott hum and because they press the international enquirey into the murder of Lebanese politician Rafik Hariri; that he wants negotiations, not peace but simply negotiations, to get American pressure of him. If so he’s not a lot more farsighted than Olmert. The ante in this poker game is liable to be a lot higher than he anticipated.