Ceasefires and Escalations

During the war in Vietnam there used to be the following pattern. The North Vietnamese, through their Vietcong terrorist allies, would launch an offensive against South Vietnam. They’d make progress in some places, get stalled in others. The Americans would bomb the heck out of their field forces and supply lines and bring them to the point of collapse. When the Vietnamese wanted a break, they would call for a cease fire—to celebrate the Vietnamese New Year, or May Day, or whatever. International pressure would force the United States to agree, on condition that the North Vietnamese refrained from using the ceasefire to reinforce or resupply its forces. The Vietnamese would of course accept, and then use the ceasefire to reinforce and resupply, so that the fighting could go on from square one.

This may sound like ancient history but it’s not. The tactic was invented in Moscow (I think it was first used in the Korean War, actually). The Russians taught it to many peoples, including the Iranians. The Iranians taught it to Hizbullah and Hamas. For them it’s not ancient history, it’s just part of the textbook for fighting Western countries. Things that work stay in the textbook generation after generation.

Our Islamofascist enemy’s greatest ally is our own hesitation. Israel’s present leadership, of course, wants peace at almost any price (for all I know it’s peace at any price—they just haven’t been put to that test yet, so that neither we nor the enemy can be sure). If we look at what’s happened in the region since the 2nd Lebanon War, however, we can see that the enemy’s strategy, for the meantime, is to play for time. During the 12 months since the war the IDF trained intensively, and for that time the balance of power shifted our way. Since then Hamas and Hizbullah have gotten stronger and stronger. Four years ago American pressure forced Syria to withdraw its forces from Lebanon, creating the possibility of sustaining a democratic, Western-oriented government in that country. The events in Lebanon over the past two weeks show that Lebanon has, in effect, fallen back into Syrian and Iranian hands. Syrian divisions are on the Lebanese border and some reports say they have already crossed back into Lebanon. Meanwhile, the IDF’s power has reached a plateau. It is retrained and reequipped, but it needs to get much bigger and more powerful it isn’t doing so.

Israel is between the jaws of a pincers in which the enemy has considerable advantages. To attack us it doesn’t need to invade us—just to shoot missiles. Its armies can dig in and wait for us to come to them in prepared defensive positions. As time passes, they get stronger. When they feel reasonably certain we no longer have the strength to go after them, they will attack.

Israel’s best strategy is the one most difficult for a democracy to take: Pick one enemy, attack and destroy it, while trying to deter the other from making a move. Israel’s attack against Syria’s reactor last year sent a double message: Not only would Israel prevent Syria from getting nuclear weapons, but the entire Syrian hinterland remains as vulnerable as Israel’s. What Israel ought to do now is conquer all of Gaza but the built-up urban areas (excepting two—Rafiah in the south an Beit Hanun in the north, which should be literally flattened, the civilian moved to tent cities under IDF control as provided for by the Fourth Geneva Convention). A ten-kilometer strip between Khan Younis and the Egyptian border should be occupied. The Syrians should be warned ahead of time that in response to attacks on Israel’s hinterland their entire energy, power, water and communications infrastructure will be eliminated, in a manner designed to cause as much civilian unrest as possible. If they do attack, Israel should carry out the threat to the letter.

It should have been done eighteen months ago. It ought to be done today.