Olmert's Worst Act

Ehud Olmert has just done immense damage to the State of Israel—damage that dwarfs anything he might have done at Annapolis, indeed anything he has done in his checkered public career. In the wild hope of saving himself from an indictment that now seems almost certain, he has involved Israel in a negotiation process, all of whose outcomes can only be bad for the country.

Syria’s foreign minister has announced that Olmert committed Israel to retreat to the line of June 4, 1967 as a precondition of talks, while not insisting on any Syrian precommitments, such as leaving the Iranian orbit and abandoning terror (Olmert’s office has issued a denial). These are the kind of terms usually offered by a country that has suffered a grave military defeat. Though Israel’s performance in the Lebanon War was disappointing, it certainly did not suffer a defeat that could justify such capitulation, nor could Syria inflict that kind of defeat now. The terms are entirely a product of Olmert’s personal situation and personal desperation.

It is not Olmert who will have to pay the price for them, though. He faces a couple of years in jail at most. The price may be paid, G-d forbid, by young men. And their families. And Israel’s civilians, huddled under bombardment in inadequate shelters. If Israel accepts the terms, war will come closer. The entire history of diplomacy suggests that if Israel rejects the terms and the negotiations fail, war is the most likely consequence.

Most Israelis and most Israeli politicians appear to appreciate how reckless Olmert’s move is. Even MK Shelli Yehimovich, from the left wing of the Labor party, said that Olmert is simply playing upon the cupidity of peace activists in hopes of staying out of jail. One junior Kadima minister has also come out against the move. Significantly, Israel radio at 2 pm Israel time reported “a senior government official” as saying that in a meeting attended by Bush, Condi Rice and Tzipi Livni last week, Bush said he thought it most unlikely Bashar Assad could bring about the changes in Syrian foreign policy he would have to make in order to conclude a genuine peace. No points for guessing the identity of the “senior government official,” hiding behind anonymity, as is her wont, rather than taking responsibility for her positions.

Oh yes, and Eli Yishai of Shas—someone else who never puts his vote where his mouth is—also came out against.

In starting negotiations under these conditions, Olmert has brought war nearer. He won’t save himself, but neither will the negotiations simply go away when he does. As Shahar Ilan writes in Ha’aretz today, “an MK who opposes a peace treaty with Syria before it is signed won’t necessarily oppose it after it is signed. . . . And when one recalls that Netanyahu also negotiated over the Golan, it is far from clear that Ehud Olmert has to be prime minister for the negotiations to be concluded. Another prime minister from Kadima can give back the Golan. Even Netanyahu.”

Ironically, in his attempt to save himself from prosecution, Olmert may have handed his hated arch-rival within Kadima, Tzipi Livni, the key to keeping her own government in business when she replaces him at the helm.

I fear that calculus of negotiation may come to have nothing to do with the prospects of real peace or a “new middle east.” Rather, it may come down to what I mentioned above—all choices are bad, but the Israeli public may feel that by agreeing to sacrifice the Golan it can buy a better chance for a longer period of shadowy no-war-no-peace. The term for that attitude is appeasement.

The next government, assuming it’s around the corner, will have to deal with the fact of negotiations. It can’t simply send the Syrians a card saying “we thought better of it, sorry.” If the negotiations are to be abandoned, it will have to be over real issues.

Two such issues are practical, foreign policy ones. First of all, the public must be made to consider what it would be like to fight a war without any of the Golan—neither a warning station on the Hermon, nor a viable defense line anywhere on the heights. Second, it must appreciate that it costs Syria nothing to get back the Golan in exchange for a piece of paper it can tear up whenever it’s ready for war. Israel must insist Syria go the whole route before a peace treaty of any sort can be signed: Kick out Palestinian terrorists, stop acting as a conduit for Iranian weapons to Hizbullah and Iranian-trained terrorists to Iraq, let Lebanon become a democracy, open its economy and society to Western, especially American, influence. Unless Syria changes its identity, a peace treaty with Syria will be meaningless. I agree with Bush, I don’t think Assad can or wants to do it.

The most important issue, however, is the most difficult to sell to the public, and it’s precisely because this is true that it’s the most important issue: Appeasement is a sign of moral collapse. The likelihood of war is determined only secondarily by borders, deployments, and ancillary conditions. Fundamentally, nothing makes war more likely than the perception of a tyrant that his opponent’s moral will to resist has crumbled. Unlike Olmert, Israel cannot afford to be tired of winning, because the alternative is defeat.